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Abstract
We characterize the equilibrium set of a two-good, pure-credit economy with limited commitment, under
both pairwise and centralized meetings. We show that the set of equilibria derived under not-too-
tight solvency constraints (Alvarez and Jermann, 2000) commonly used in the literature is of measure
zero in the whole set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. There exist a continuum of stationary equilibria,
a continuum of endogenous credit cycles of any periodicity, and a continuum of sunspot equilibria,
irrespective of the assumed trading mechanism. Equilibria featuring too-tight" solvency constraints can
generate growing credit limits over time, periodic credit shutdowns, and heterogeneous debt limits across
ex-ante identical borrowers. Moreover, we provide examples of credit cycles that dominate, from a social
welfare point of view, all equilibria with not-too-tightsolvency constraints.
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1 Introduction
The inability of individuals to commit to fulll their future obligations is a key friction of decentralized
economies that jeopardizes the Arrow-Debreu apparatus based on promises to deliver goods at di¤erent
dates and states. While limited commitment is a prominent friction in monetary theory, it is absent from
most policy-oriented models that focus on cashless economies (e.g., Woodford, 2003). Arguably, advances
in record-keeping technologies make credit feasible for a larger set of transactions and thereby reduce the
demand for cash, but they do not eliminate the fundamental lack-of-commitment problem that plagues
intertemporal trades.1
In this paper, we study a two-good, pure credit economy with (imperfect) public monitoring in which the
only friction is limited commitment. The literature studying such economies typically lacks game-theoretic
foundations and simply imposes the harshest punishment available for default, e.g., autarky or exclusion
from all intertemporal trades. A normative justication in the context of one-good economies (Alvarez
and Jermann, 2000) is that the harshest punishment allows agents to exploit the largest gains from trade by
relaxing borrowing constraints and thereby implements constrained-e¢ cient allocations. This logic, however,
does not necessarily generalize to economies with multiple goods. Hence, we relax such exogenous restrictions
on strategies and provide a game-theoretic analysis to uncover the full range of equilibrium phenomena that
can emerge in economies with limited commitment.
We characterize the full set of perfect Bayesian equilibria in order to answer the following questions. Do
credit economies feature endogenous instability, such as cycles, in the absence of changes in fundamentals? If
endogenous cycles exist, are they more or less prevalent than those in pure currency economies? Can credit
grow without changes in monitoring technologies? Can cross-sectional di¤erences in access to credit be the
result of self-fullling beliefs? For all these questions, our answers di¤er from those provided by the existing
literature because, perhaps surprisingly, it has focused on a narrow set of equilibria.
The economy we study has public record-keeping, random matching in pairwise meetings or in large
groups, and intertemporal gains from trade that can be exploited with one-period debt contracts. In the
absence of public record keeping, the environment corresponds to the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005)
so that we can easily compare equilibrium allocations in pure credit and pure currency economies. In the
presence of a public record-keeping technology the environment is analogous to the one in Gu et al. (2013b),
GMMW hereafter.2 The competitive version of our model in which trades occur in large groups is closely
1Woodford (2003, Chapter 1, Section 3.2) argues that "...it is possible to imagine that in the coming century the development
of electronic payments systems could not only substitute for the use of currency in transactions, but also eliminate any advantage
of clearing payments through accounts held by central bank..."
2As we discuss later in details, there are di¤erences regarding the timing of production that are inconsequential.
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related to Alvarez and Jermann (2000), AJ hereafter, but it di¤ers in important ways including preferences
over two goods.
We start with a simple mechanism where the borrower in each bilateral match sets the terms of the
loan contract unilaterally, which allows us to analyze the economy as an innitely-repeated game with
imperfect monitoring. We rst consider equilibria where agents can issue the maximum amount of debt
that is incentive-compatible with no default in every period  they are subject to not-too-tightsolvency
constraints according to the terminology in AJ. Under such constraints there is a unique active steady-state
equilibrium and a continuum of equilibria with decreasing output levels over time, but no equilibrium with
endogenous cycles. In contrast, the set of all perfect Bayesian equilibria is much bigger  equilibria under
not-too-tightsolvency constraints is of measure zero in that set. It contains a continuum of steady-state
equilibria and a continuum of periodic equilibria of any periodicity. Each equilibrium can be reduced to a
sequence of debt limits, where the debt limit in a period species the amount that agents can be trusted
to repay. These results are robust to the choice of the mechanism to determine the terms of the loan
contract Nash or proportional bargaining, or even competitive pricing if agents meet in large groups.
How are we able to support an equilibrium set so much larger than the one under not-too-tightsolvency
constraints? The answer has to do with relaxing restrictions imposed on out-of-equilibrium behavior. We
construct the set of all equilibrium outcomes by considering simple strategies that punish borrowers for
certain types of default as well as lenders from extending excessively large loans. Borrowers who default on
loans of size equal or less than the equilibrium loan size are punished with permanent autarky. However, if
a borrower receives a loan that is larger than the equilibrium loan, an o¤-equilibrium event, they only have
to repay the equilibrium loan size in order to avoid being in bad standing with future lenders. Indeed, it is
not optimal for lenders to punish partial default on excessively high loans provided that borrowers repay the
amount they were trustworthy to repay in equilibrium.
A simple example illustrates the intuition. Suppose equilibrium beliefs are such that borrowers are
deemed trustworthy to repay loans up to $100. An individual who defaults on a loan at or below $100 is
deemed as untrustworthy and not given a loan in the future. However, suppose an individual is given a loan
of $200 but only pays back $100. The key question is whether this individual, who did repay the amount
they were supposed to in equilibrium, should still be trusted to repay loans in the future? Our equilibrium
strategies say yes while equilibria under not-too-tightsolvency constraints say no, as default on any loan
(on or o¤ equilibrium) is punished with permanent autarky. We prove that these simple strategies form a
PBE and that all equilibrium outcomes can be obtained from such strategies.
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Why is this larger set of credit equilibria relevant? First, as a matter of theory, it is useful to characterize
the full set of equilibria of a pure credit economy based on the standard equilibrium notion (essentially,
subgame perfection) used in repeated games and monetary theory. By imposing arbitrary not-too-tight
solvency constraints the literature has focused on a narrow set of equilibrium outcomes of measure zero in
the set of all equilibria. However, the large multiplicity of equilibria does not imply that everything goes.
Fundamentals, including preferences and market structure, do matter for an outcome to be consistent with an
equilibrium. We show that the set of credit-cycle equilibria expands as trading frictions are reduced, agents
are more patient, and borrowers have more bargaining power (in the version of the model with bargaining).
Second, focusing only on equilibria supported by not-too-tightsolvency constraints cannot be justied
by standard renements.3 We show that all equilibria are weakly renegotiation-proof, based on the standard
notion proposed for repeated games. Moreover, these equilibria do not have better normative properties; we
provide examples where there are a continuum of equilibria that dominate, from a social welfare point of
view, the best equilibrium under not-too-tightsolvency constraints.4
Finally, by considering the full set of PBE, we uncover new equilibrium outcomes in credit markets. There
are a continuum of equilibria featuring endogenous credit booms and busts, including those in which credit
completely dries up and recovers later on. Hence, it is not di¢ cult to generate endogenous volatility in credit
economies once we relax the exogenously imposed not-too-tightconstraints. There are equilibria featuring
endogenous credit growth, with monotone-increasing debt limits. These equilibria exist without any changes
in fundamentals, such as monitoring technology. There are asymmetric equilibria with rich distributions of
debt limits across ex-ante homogeneous agents, so that heterogeneity in access to credit is potentially the
result of self-fullling beliefs. We also show that not-too-tightconstraints exclude outcomes of the pure
monetary economy (with at money but no record keeping) even though they form a strict subset of the
outcomes of the pure credit economy (with record keeping but no at money). So the result according to
which cycles should be less prevalent in pure credit economies is the direct consequence of the imposition of
not-too-tight solvency constraints.5 Indeed, all dynamic allocations of monetary economies (e.g., cycles,
chaos) are also outcomes in PBE of pure credit economies.
3To be clear, we are not advocating the use of any renement beyond the standard notion of subgame perfection. Since it
is the equilibrium concept used in all monetary theory, rening the equilibrium set could lead to misleading comparisons of
allocations between pure currency and pure credit environments.
4We generalize this result in a companion paper (Bethune et al., 2017) where we study, in detail, the planners problem
subject to incentive constraints.
5See the discussion in Section 5.2. Lagos and Wright (2003) show that pure currency economies can generate uctuations
and cycles; however, GMMW need to add an additional preference parameter to this environment to generate cycles. Otherwise,
cycles do not exist under not-too-tight solvency constraints, consistent with our nding in Proposition 2.
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Literature We adopt an environment similar to the pure currency economy of Lagos and Wright (2005)
and Rocheteau and Wright (2005), but we replace currency with a public record-keeping technology, as in
Sanches and Williamson (2010, Section 4).6 Our paper extends the analysis of Sanches-Williamson (2010)
which focuses on steady states and of GMMW which focuses on cycles. In both cases, the equilibrium
notion considered imposes the not-too-tight solvency constraints of AJ. Sanches and Williamson (2010)
prove the existence of two steady states, one with a positive level of credit and one with a complete credit
shut-down. GMMW generalize this nding by showing the existence of periodic equilibria for some trad-
ing mechanisms. Instead, we present our model as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring with few
restrictions on strategies and beliefs (the same restrictions typically imposed on equilibria of pure currency
economies).7 In addition, we consider both stationary and non-stationary equilibria (including endogenous
cycles and sunspots), and various trading mechanisms (ultimatum games, axiomatic bargaining solutions,
competitive pricing).
Our paper is part of the large literature on limited commitment in macroeconomics. Seminal contributions
on risk sharing in endowment economies where agents lack commitment include Kehoe and Levine (1993),
Kocherlakota (1996), and AJ. Kocherlakota (1996) adopts a mechanism design approach in a two-agent
economy with a single good. In contrast we study a two-good production economy where a continuum
of agents search for new partners every period. Kocherlakota (1998) shows that the set of implementable
outcomes of monetary economies is a subset of the implementable outcomes of pure credit economies.8 We
nd a similar result, but in contrast to Kocherlakota, we take the trading mechanism as given and we do
not restrict outcomes to stationary ones.
Finally, our methods to characterize equilibrium outcomes are related but di¤er from the ones used by
Abreu (1988) and Abreu et al. (1990) as our stage game has an extensive form and only buyers/borrowers
are (imperfectly) monitored.
2 Environment
Time is discrete and starts with period 0. Each date has two stages. The rst stage will be referred to as
the DM (decentralized market) while the second stage will be referred to as the CM (centralized market).
6See Rocheteau and Nosal (2017, Chapter 2) for an overview of pure credit economies in the Lagos and Wright (2005)
environment. Not-too-tight solvency constraints have been extensively used in the New Monetarist literature to study, for
example, the link between aggregate unemployment and unsecured credit (Bethune et al., 2015), the interaction between private
and public debt (Carapella and Williamson, 2015), and the coexistence of money and credit (Lotz and Zhang, 2016, and Araujo
and Hu, 2017).
7Repeated games where agents are matched bilaterally and at random and change trading partners over time are studied in
Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). A thorough review of the literature is provided by Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
8Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) study an environment similar to AJ and show that the set of equilibrium allocations with
self-enforcing private debt is equivalent to the allocations that are sustained with money.
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There is a single, perishable good at each stage and the CM good will be taken as the numéraire. There
is a continuum of agents of measure two divided evenly into a subset of buyers, B, and a subset of sellers,
S.9 The labels buyerand seller refer to agentsroles in the DM: only the sellers can produce the DM
good (and hence will be lenders) and only the buyers desire DM goods (and hence will be borrowers). In
the DM, a fraction  2 (0; 1] of buyers meet with sellers in pairs. (We consider a version of the model with
large meetings later.) The CM will be the stage where agents settle debts.
Preferences are additively separable over dates and stages. The DM utility of a seller who produces
y 2 R+ is  v(y), while that of a buyer who consumes y is u(y), where v(0) = u(0) = 0, v and u are strictly
increasing and di¤erentiable with v convex and u strictly concave, and u0(0) = +1 > v0(0) = 0. Moreover,
there exists ~y > 0 such that v(~y) = u(~y). We denote by y = argmax [u(y)  v(y)] > 0 the quantity that
maximizes the match surplus. The utility of consuming z 2 R units of the numéraire good is z, where z < 0
is interpreted as production.10 Agentscommon discount factor across periods is   1=(1 + r) 2 (0; 1).
With no loss in generality, we restrict our attention to intra-period loans issued in the DM and repaid
in the subsequent CM.11 The terms of the loan contracts are determined according to a simple protocol
whereby buyers make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to sellers. We describe alternative mechanisms later in the
paper. Agents cannot commit to future actions. Therefore, the repayment of loans in the CM has to be
self-enforcing.
There is a technology allowing loan contracts in the DM and repayments in the CM to be publicly
recorded. The entry in the public record for each loan is a triple, (`; x; i), composed of the size of the loan
negotiated in the DM in terms of the numéraire good, ` 2 R+, the amount repaid in the CM, x 2 R+, and
the identity of the buyer, i 2 B. If no credit is issued in a pairwise meeting, or if i was unmatched, the entry
in the public record is (0; 0; i). The record is updated at the end of each period t as follows:
it+1 = [
i
t; (`t; xt; i)]; (1)
where i0 = (`0; x0; i). The list of records for all buyers, t = hit : i 2 Bi, is public information to all
agents.12 Agents have private information about their trading histories that are not recorded; in particular,
9The assumption of ex-ante heterogeneity among agents is borrowed from Rocheteau and Wright (2005). Alternatively, one
could assume that an agents role in the DM is determined at random in every period without a¤ecting any of our results.
10Kehoe and Levine (1993) and AJ consider pure exchange economies. One could reinterpret our economy as an endowment
economy as follows. Suppose that sellers receive an endowment y in the DM and z in the CM. Buyers have no endowment in
the DM but an endowment z in the CM. The DM utility of the seller is w(c) where w is a concave function with w0(y) = 0.
Hence, the opportunity cost to the seller of giving up y units of consumption is v(y) = w(y)  w(y   y).
11Under linear payo¤s in the CM one-period debt contracts are optimal, i.e., agents have no incentives to smooth the
repayment of debt across multiple periods. This assumption will facilitate the comparison with pure monetary economies of
the type studied in Lagos and Wright (2005).
12We could make alternative assumptions regarding what is recorded in a match. For instance, the technology could also
record the output level, y, together with the promises made by the buyer, i.e., i = (y; `; x; i). Not surprisingly, this would
expand the set of equilibrium outcomes. Moreover, we could assume that the seller only observes the record of the buyer he is
matched with, i, without a¤ecting our results.
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if it = (0; 0; i), then agents other than i do not know whether i was matched but his o¤er got rejected (in
that case, the o¤er made is not observed either) or was unmatched. However, as discussed later, this private
information plays no role in our construction of equilibria.
3 The equilibrium set
For each buyer i 2 B, a strategy, si, consists of two functions sit = (sit;1; sit;2) at each period t conditional
on being matched: sit;1 maps his private trading history, h
i
t, and public records of other buyers, 
 i
t , to
an o¤er to the seller, (yt; `t); sit;2 maps ((h
i
t; 
 i
t ); (yt; `t)), together with the sellers response, to his CM
repayment, xt. For each seller j 2 S, a strategy, sj , consists of one function at each period t, conditional
on being matched with buyer i: sjt maps the sellers private trading history, h
j
t , the buyers identity and
public records, (i; it; 
 i
t ), and his current o¤er, (yt; `t), to a response, yes or no. We restrict our attention
to perfect Bayesian equilibria (see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, Denition 232.1) satisfying the following
conditions:
(A1) Public strategies. In any DM meeting the strategies only depend on histories that are common
knowledge in the match, including the buyers public trading history, his o¤er and the sellers response in
the current match, but not on private histories (nor the public records of other buyers).13
(A2) Symmetry. All buyers adopt the same strategy, sb, and all sellers adopt the same strategy, ss.
Moreover, the buyers o¤er strategy, sbt;1, is constant over all public trading histories of the buyer that
are consistent with equilibrium behavior, and in particular, equilibrium o¤ers at date-t are independent of
matching histories.
(A3) Threshold rule for repayments. For each buyer i and each date t following any history, there exists a
number, dt, such that dt is weakly larger than the equilibrium loan amount at date t, and sbt;2(
i
t; (yt; `t); yes) =
`t if `t  dt and if it is consistent with equilibrium behavior.
We call a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, (sb; ss), satisfying conditions (A1)-(A3) above a credit equilibrium.
A few remarks are in order about these conditions. Our record-keeping technology does not record all actions
taken by the agents. Agents have private information about the number of matches they had, quantities they
consumed, or o¤ers that were rejected. Because of this private information using perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) as the solution concept is both standard and necessary. Alternatively, one may assume that all actions
are observable, and PBE is reduced to subgame perfection. Although we prefer our environment, which is
closer to the existing literature on monetary economics, our multiplicity result does not rely on the presence
of private information. In fact, because of our focus on public strategies, (A1), any PBE we construct is also
13For a formal denition of public strategies see Denition 7.1.1 in Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
6
a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) if all actions were observable.14 However, agentsbeliefs about how
other agents will respond to deviations do matter but they are pinned down by equilibrium strategies.
Conditions (A1) and (A2) imply that, for any credit equilibrium, its outcomes are characterized by
f(yt; `t)g+1t=0 , the sequence of equilibrium o¤ers made by buyers. Moreover, (A3) implies that xt = `t for
each t, and hence the sequence f(yt; `t)g+1t=0 also determines the equilibrium allocation. Without (A1),
equilibrium o¤ers may depend on the buyers past matching histories.15 Condition (A3) is not vacuous
either. It restricts sellers to believe that buyers will repay their debt when observing a deviating o¤er with
obligations smaller than those in equilibrium.16 This restriction will rule out ine¢ ciently large trades. As
we will see later, taken together the restrictions (A1)-(A3) will allow us to obtain a simple representation of
credit equilibria with solvency constraints added to the bargaining problem.
Let f(yt; `t)g+1t=0 be a sequence of equilibrium o¤ers. Along the equilibrium path the lifetime expected
discounted utility of a buyer at the beginning of period t is
V bt =
1X
s=0
s[u(yt+s)  `t+s]: (2)
In each period t + s the buyer is matched with a seller with probability  in which case the buyer asks for
yt+s units of DM output in exchange for a repayment of `t+s units of the numéraire in the following CM
and the seller agrees. In any equilibrium  `t + V bt+1  0, which simply says that a buyer must be better
o¤ repaying his debt and going along with the equilibrium rather than defaulting on his debt and o¤ering
no-trade in all future matches, (yt+s; `t+s) = (0; 0) for all s > 0. By a similar reasoning the lifetime expected
utility of a seller along the equilibrium path is
V st =
1X
s=0
s[ (yt+s)  `t+s]: (3)
The sellers participation constraint in the DM requires  v(yt) + `t  0 since a seller can reject a trade
without fear of retribution (since he is not monitored.) Given that buyers set the terms of trade unilaterally,
and the output level is not part of the record i, this participation constraint holds at equality. Our rst
proposition builds on these observations to characterize outcomes of credit equilibria.
Proposition 1 A sequence, f(yt; xt; `t)g1t=0, is a credit equilibrium outcome if and only if, for each t =
14 In such an equilibrium, sellersbeliefs about buyersprivate information are irrelevant for their decisions to accept or reject
o¤ers. Hence, actions that correspond to agentsprivate trading histories would not matter even if they were publicly observable.
15Obviously, when  = 1, the matching-history-independence element in (A1) is vacuous. However, when  < 1, it would be
di¢ cult to fully characterize all equilibrium outcomes without (A1) but it certainly adds many more equilibria.
16Without this restriction one could sustain equilibria in which yt > y for some t; to do so, one can adopt a strategy that
triggers a permanent autarky for the buyer if his o¤er `t is smaller than the equilibrium one.
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0; 1; :::,
`t 
1X
s=1
s[u(yt+s)  `t+s] (4)
`t = xt = v(yt)  v(y): (5)
As mentioned earlier, a sequence of equilibrium o¤ers, f(yt; `t)g+1t=0 , also determines the sequence of
allocations, f(yt; xt)g+1t=0 , with xt = `t for each t, and hence, Proposition 1 also gives a characterization of
allocations that can be sustained in a credit equilibrium. Condition (4), which follows directly from (2) and
the incentive constraint  `t + V bt+1  0, is analogous to the participation constraint (IR) in Kehoe and
Levine (1993), and the participation constraint in Proposition 2.1 in Kocherlakota (1996). However, while
Kehoe and Levine assume the IR constraint from the outset as a primitive condition, (4) is derived as an
equilibrium condition in our framework. The condition (5) is the outcome of the buyers take-it-or-leave-it
o¤er and pairwise Pareto e¢ ciency (which follows from the threshold rule A3).17
Proposition 1 shows that the conditions (4)-(5) are not only necessary but also su¢ cient for an equilibrium
by constructing a simple equilibrium strategy prole. This strategy prole relies on punishments the penal
code in Abreus (1988) terminology for both default and excessive lending.18 Specically, buyers can be
in two states at the beginning of period t, i;t 2 fG;Ag, where G means good standing and A means
autarky and each buyers initial state is i;0 = G. The law of motion of a buyer is state following a loan
and repayment (~`; ~x) is given by:
i;t+1

~`; ~x; i;t

=

A if ~x < min(~`; `t) or i;t = A
G otherwise
; (6)
where (~`; ~x) might di¤er from the loan and repayment along the equilibrium path, `t = xt. In order to
remain in good standing, or state G, the buyer must repay his loan, ~x  ~`, if the size of the loan is no greater
than the equilibrium loan size, ~` `t, and he must repay the equilibrium loan size, ~x  `t, otherwise.19 The
autarky state, A, is absorbing: once a buyer becomes untrustworthy, he stays untrustworthy forever. Sellers
cannot be punished in future periods for accepting a loan larger than `t since their identity is not recorded.
However, they are punished in the current period because buyers are allowed to partially default on loans
larger than `t while keeping their good standing with future lenders.
17To derive these conditions formally one has to use the assumption that yt is not publicly recorded only the loan contract
is and the threshold property in (A3). See proof of Proposition 1.
18There are di¤erent approaches for nding equilibria of repeated games. Abreu et al. (1990) introduce the idea of self-
generating set of equilibrium payo¤s while Abreu (1988) introduces the notion of simple strategies. See Mailath and Samuelson
(2006, Section 2.5) for a review of these approaches. We use a related but di¤erent approach from the one of Abreu (1988) as
our stage game has an extensive form and only a subset of the agents (the buyers) are monitored.
19Note that the buyer can remain in state G even if he does not pay his debt in full, and hence default is with respect to the
common belief that buyers repay up to the size of the equilibrium loan. Also, notice that there are alternative strategy proles
that deliver the same equilibrium outcome. For instance, an alternative automaton is such that the transition to state A only
occurs if ~x < ~` `t. If a loan such that ~`> `t is accepted, then the buyer can default without fear of retribution.
8
The strategies, (sb; ss), depend on the buyers state as follows. The sellers strategy, sst , consists of
accepting all o¤ers, (~y; ~`), such that v(~y)  minf~`; `tg provided that the buyers state is i;t = G. The
buyer repays sbt;2 = minf`t; ~`g if he is in state G, and he does not repay anything otherwise, sbt;2 = 0. These
strategies are depicted in Figure 1 where (yt; `t) is the o¤er made by a buyer in state G along the equilibrium
path and (~y; ~`) is any o¤er. By the one-stage-deviation principle it is then straightforward to show that any
f(yt; `t)g1t=0 that satises (4)-(5) is an outcome for the strategy prole (sb; ss).
DM offer
DM offer
Buyer’s state: G
Buyer’s state: A
Accept and repay
Any action
Reject or
Accept and repay
Autarky
},min{ lltx ³
},min{ ll tx <
),( tty l ),( ly
),( ly
Figure 1: Automaton representation of the buyers strategy
In the following we propose an alternative formulation of a credit equilibrium in terms of solvency
constraints imposed on the bargaining problems in the DM. As in AJ in the context of an economy with
competitive trades, a solvency constraint species an upper bound called a debt limit on the quantity of
debt an agent can issue, `  dt. According to this formulation, the buyer in a DM match sets the terms of
the loan contract so as to maximize his surplus, u(y)  `, subject to the sellers participation constraint and
the solvency (or borrowing) constraint, `  dt, i.e.,
max
y;`
fu(y)  `g s.t.   (y) + `  0 and `  dt: (7)
The solution to (7) is `t = (yt) where
yt = z(dt)  minfy; v 1(dt)g: (8)
The solvency constraint is reminiscent to the feasibility constraint in monetary models (e.g., Lagos and
Wright, 2005) according to which buyers in bilateral matches cannot spend more than their real balances.
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We say that a sequence of debt limits, fdtg1t=0, is consistent with a credit equilibrium outcome, f(yt; xt; `t)g1t=0,
if (yt; `t) is a solution to the bargaining problem, (7), given dt for all t 2 N0, and the buyers CM strategy
consists of repaying his debt up to dt provided that his past public histories (up to period t 1) are consistent
with equilibrium behavior, that is, the sequence fdtg satises condition (A3).
It is easy to check from the proof of Proposition 1 that any credit equilibrium outcome, f(yt; xt; `t)g1t=0,
is consistent with the sequence of debt limits, fdtg1t=0, such that dt = `t for all t 2 N0. But the same
equilibrium outcome may be implementable by multiple debt limits if (9) is slack and yt = y. The following
corollary summarizes these results and reduces a credit equilibrium to a sequence of debt limits, fdtg1t=0,
that satises a sequence of participation constraints.
Corollary 1 (Equilibrium representation with debt limits) A sequence of debt limits, fdtg1t=0, is
consistent with a credit equilibrium outcome if and only if
dt 
1X
s=1
s[u(yt+s)  v(yt+s)] (9)
v(yt) = minfdt; v(y)g: (10)
Corollary 1 gives a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes using debt limits. Indeed, by (10),
yt is determined by dt, and hence (9) can be viewed as an inequality that involves fdtg1t=0 as the only
endogenous variables. Without the danger of confusion, we also call a sequence of debt limits, fdtg1t=0, a
credit equilibrium if it satises (9) and (10). The next corollary provides a su¢ cient condition for a credit
equilibrium in recursive form.
Corollary 2 (Recursive su¢ cient condition) Any bounded sequence, fdtg+1t=0 , that satises
dt   f [u(yt+1)  v(yt+1)] + dt+1g ; (11)
where v(yt) = minfdt; v(y)g, is a credit equilibrium.
The left side of (11) is the cost of repaying the current debt limit while the right side of (11) is the
benet which has two components: the expected match surplus of a buyer who has access to credit and his
continuation value given by the debt limit next-period. We represent the right side of (11) by the red curve
in Figure 2. Any fdtg located above this curve is a credit equilibrium.
The following proposition characterizes all equilibria with not-too-tightsolvency constraints, meaning
dt is the largest debt limit that solves the buyers CM participation constraint, (9), at equality. Graphically,
in Figure 2 fdtg must lie exactly on the red curve. Let dmax denote the unique positive root to rdmax =
fu[z(dmax)]  v[z(dmax)]g.
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Figure 2: Phase lines in the pure credit economy (red) and pure monetary economy (green). The dashed-
black line gives a candidate equilibrium, either in the pure credit economy or in the monetary equilibrium
(Section 5.2).
Proposition 2 (Symmetric Equilibria under not-too-tight constraints.) There are three types of
symmetric equilibria under not-too-tight solvency constraint: (i) dt = 0 for all t; (ii) dt = dmax for all t;
(iii) d0 2 (0; dmax) and fdtg is strictly monotone decreasing.
The restriction of not-too-tight solvency constraints does not narrow down the equilibrium set to a
single element. As shown in Sanches and Williamson (2010), there are two steady states, one without credit
and one with the highest incentive-feasible debt limit, dmax. In Figure 2 they correspond to the intersections
between the phase line of the credit economy and the 45o line. As shown by Bloise et al. (2013) for a one-
good competitive economy, there is a also a continuum of non-stationary equilibria where the initial debt
limit is between 0 and dmax and the debt limit falls over time.20 However, there are no equilibria with cycles
or uctuations, in contrast to equilibrium outcomes of pure monetary economies (e.g., Lagos and Wright,
2003).
4 Renegotiation proofness
We show in this section that all the credit equilibrium outcomes we constructed are also outcomes of weakly
renegotiation-proof equilibria (Farrell and Maskin, 1989). A WRP equilibrium is a subgame perfect equi-
20Bloise et al. (2013) prove indeterminacy of competitive equilibrium in sequential economies under not-too-tightsolvency
constraints. They show that for any value of social welfare inbetween autarky and constrained optimality, there exists an
equilibrium attaining that value.
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librium where any two continuation payo¤s are not Pareto-rankable. Intuitively, if there were such Pareto-
dominated equilibrium in any subgame, it seems at some heuristic level that agents should be able to rene-
gotiate and coordinate on the continuation equilibrium that Pareto dominates. Since WRP is formulated
for games with perfect information and with two players, to apply this concept, we consider a two-player
version of our game, but as we explain later the concepts can be carried over to the general environment. In
this version, there is only one buyer and one seller, and they meet at each period with probability . Note
that, however, all credit equilibria remain SPE in this two-player version. Finally, since we have two stages
at each period, we apply the requirement of WRP to the continuation values at the beginning of the DMs.
Consider a stationary credit equilibrium with debt limit d and DM output, y. In our constructed equilib-
rium strategy, buyers are either in good standing or bad standing with corresponding value functions V b and
V^ b. With autarky as the punishment (which was part of the construction of an equilibrium ), V^ b = 0. In
good standing, the continuation value of the buyer at the beginning of DM is V b =  [u(y)  v(y)] = (1  )
and the continuation value of the seller is V s = 0 since repayment is x = v(y). The repayment constraint is
 v(y) + V b  V^ b () v(y)  d  V b:
Recall that we use this simple strategy to recover all equilibrium outcomes. However, this simple equilibrium
strategy does not satisfy WRP, which requires that continuation values in di¤erent subgames are not Pareto
ranked. Indeed, the continuation values following the buyers bad standing, V^ b = 0 and V^ s = 0, are Pareto
dominated by the one following good standing, V b > 0 if d > 0 and V s = 0.
Nevertheless, for any stationary credit equilibrium outcome d 2 [0; dmax], we can construct a WRP
equilibrium with the same equilibrium allocation as follows. A buyer in bad standing can retain a good
standing if and only if the following happens. First, the buyer has a successful DM meeting. Second, his
o¤er (y; x) has to satisfy x  d  V b and y = 0. Intuitively, the buyer repays at least the value from being
in good standing without asking for any consumption. Finally, the seller has to accept the o¤er and the
buyer has to repay d in the CM. In equilibrium, the buyer in bad standing o¤ers (0; d), the seller accepts it,
and the buyer repays d and regains a good standing. Strategies on the equilibrium path are as before. The
constructed strategies form a SPE. First, the continuation value for a buyer with bad standing, denoted by
V^ b, remains zero if he follows the proposed strategy:
V^ b = f d+ V bg+ (1  )V^ b = (1  )V^ b;
and hence V^ b = 0. This also implies the buyer is weakly better o¤making the o¤er (0; d) than any other o¤er
(which will be either rejected or has higher repayment). The seller is also willing to accept the o¤er. In this
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proposed equilibrium, no two continuation values can be (strictly) Pareto ranked. When in good standing,
the sellers continuation value is V s = 0; in bad standing, the sellers continuation value is V^ s = d > 0.
These results can be extended to our benchmark environment with a continuum of agents if we assume
perfect monitoring and use the continuation values right after the DM matches are formed to capture the
idea that a pair may renegotiate.21
5 Equilibria of special interest
In this section we focus on PBE without imposing not-too-tightsolvency constraints and show that doing
so reveals equilibria that could be relevant in understanding phenomena in credit markets. We show there
exists a continuum of symmetric steady-state equilibria in which all borrowers face the same credit limit
and a continuum of asymmetric steady-state equilibria in which there exists heterogeneity in credit limits
across otherwise observationally equivalent borrowers (Section 5.1). We show that the set of credit equilibria
contains the set of pure monetary equilibria, including non-stationary ones (Section 5.2). We show that not
only are credit booms and busts ubiquitous there are a continuum of PBE credit cycles of any periodicity
but some feature credit completely drying up in certain periods (Section 5.3). Finally, we show that PBE
can feature endogenous credit growth (Section 5.4) or sunspot equilibria in which credit limits depend on
idiosyncratic observable states, such as an agents employment status (Section 5.5).
5.1 Symmetric and asymmetric steady states
Until now, we have focused on symmetric equilibria based on restrictions (A2) and (A3). Our framework
can be easily extended to allow for asymmetric stationary equilibria where each buyers debt limit is indexed
by his identity. In particular, we use F : B! R+ to denote the debt limit assignment for each buyer. Thus,
for each buyer, the incentive-compatibility condition, (9), or, equivalently, (11), can be simplied to read:
rd   fu [z(d)]   [z(d)]g ; (12)
where z given by (8) indicates the DM level of output as a function of d.
Proposition 3 (Steady-State Equilibria) There exists a continuum of symmetric steady-state, credit
equilibria indexed by d 2 [0; dmax] with dmax > 0. Additionally, for any distribution F with support [0; dmax]
there is an asymmetric equilibrium where the distribution of debt limits across buyers is given by F .
21The construction of equilibrium strategies remains the same, and the argument for WRP is the same: since continuation
values are completely pinned down by the buyer standings, and matches with good standing have better payo¤s to buyers while
matches with bad standing have better payo¤s to sellers, no two continuation values can be Pareto ranked.
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Any debt limit between the two values obtained under not-too-tightsolvency constraints, 0 and dmax,
is also part of an equilibrium. There are many ways to generate PBE outcomes with d 2 (0; dmax). We can
adopt the simple strategies described earlier according to which a buyer remains trustworthy as long as he
repays d. Alternatively, one can consider strategies that punish buyers who default by temporary exclusion
from trades instead of permanent autarky. Suppose that a buyer in bad standing recovers his good standing
with probability  at the end of a period. (One could also consider punishment of deterministic length.)
Then, the value of being in bad standing solves V^ b = V b+(1 )V^ b and the highest debt limit consistent
with no default solves
(r + ) d =  [u(y)  v(y)] :
Yet another option is to have agents who default be restricted from credit with lower, but positive, debt
limits in the future. There are now three states: good standing, bad standing, and autarky. Agents transition
from good to bad standing the rst time they default. If agents default more than once they stay in autarky
permanently. The debt limits in good and bad standing, d and d^ respectively, solve
rd =  f[u(y)  v(y)]  [u(y^)  v(y^)]g
rd^   [u(y^)  v(y^)] :
The debt limit d^ is sustained by the simple strategies described earlier. Such equilibria do not arise under
not-too-tightconstraints.
Proposition 3 also establishes the existence of asymmetric equilibria with a distribution of debt limits
across buyers. Under not-too-tightconstraints the support of the distribution is limited to f0; dmaxg, i.e.,
buyers can either borrow at the highest debt limit, dmax, or they cannot borrow at all. In contrast, we can
generate equilibria with a continuous distribution of debt limits over the interval [0; dmax].
The existence of asymmetric equilibria with d 2 f0; dmaxg is used by Carapella and Williamson (2015)
to construct equilibria with default along the equilibrium path. Suppose, for instance, that the extrinsic
characteristic that determines d is private information in some meetings. In a pooling equilibrium agents
with d = 0 can receive a loan and nd it optimal to default on that loan. Using a similar reasoning, we can
use asymmetric equilibria with d 2 [0; dmax] to generate partial default in equilibrium.
5.2 Pure monetary outcomes
Proposition 2 showed that equilibria with not-too-tight solvency constraints do not exhibit uctuations.
This nding is consistent with GMMW according to whom the model must be modied by adding a prefer-
ence parameter in order to generate cycles (see our Section 6). But it is puzzling given that pure currency
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economies can generate uctuations and cycles (e.g., Lagos and Wright, 2003) and we know from Kocher-
lakota (1998) that there are equivalence results in terms of implementation between pure currency and pure
credit economies. In order to reconcile these di¤erent ndings we now show that the set of credit equilibrium
outcomes contains all equilibrium outcomes of a pure monetary economy, including its non-stationary ones,
provided that one does not impose not-too-tightconstraints.22
In order to establish this result we shut down the record-keeping technology: individual trading histories
are private information in a match. Without any record-keeping technology credit is no longer incentive-
feasible as a buyer would nd it optimal to renege on his debt. Suppose that all buyers are endowed with
M = 1 unit of at money at time t = 0, which makes the environment identical to the one in Lagos and
Wright (2003, 2005). The CM price of money in terms of the numéraire good, denoted t, solves the following
rst-order di¤erence equation (see, e.g., Lagos and Wright, 2003):
t = t+1

1 + 
u0(yt+1)  0(yt+1)
0(yt+1)

; (13)
where yt+1 =  1(t+1). A monetary equilibrium is a bounded sequence,
f(yt; xt; t)g+1t=0 , that solves (13), with v(yt) = xt = minft; v(y)g.
Proposition 4 (Monetary vs Credit Equilibria) Let f(yt; xt; t)g+1t=0 be a monetary equilibrium of the
economy with no record-keeping. Then, f(yt; xt; `t)g+1t=0 where `t = minft; v(y)g is a credit equilibrium of
the economy with record-keeping.
Given a monetary equilibrium where the value of money is t, one can construct a pure credit equilibrium
where buyers are trustworthy to repay t. We illustrate this result in Figure 2, where the green, backward-
bending line represents the rst-order di¤erence equation for a monetary equilibrium, (13), while the red
area is the rst-order di¤erence inequality for a credit equilibrium, (11). Starting from some initial condition,
d0, we represent by a dashed line a sequence fdtg that satises the conditions for a monetary equilibrium.
This sequence also satises the conditions for a credit equilibrium, i.e., all pairs (dt; dt+1) are located in the
red area. So the existence of equilibria with endogenous uctuations in pure credit economies should not
come as a surprise given that equivalent equilibria exist in pure monetary economies. As we will show in the
following, the reverse of Proposition 4 does not hold; there are equilibria of pure credit economies that are
not equilibria of pure monetary economies.
22This result is related to those in Kocherlakota (1998), but with a key di¤erence: while Kocherlakota (1998) shows that
the set of all implementable outcomes (allowing for arbitrary trading mechanisms) using money is contained in the set of all
implementable outcomes with memory, we compare the equilibrium outcomes for the two economies under a particular trading
mechanism. See also supplementary appendix S1 for the robustness to other trading mechanisms.
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5.3 Credit booms and busts
We now show that credit economies have a much larger set of periodic equilibria than in monetary economies.
We start with 2-period cycles, fd0; d1g, where d0 is the debt limit in even periods and d1 is the debt limit in
odd periods. The incentive-compatibility condition, (9), becomes:
rdt 


u(y(t+1)mod 2)  (y(t+1)mod 2)

+  [u(yt)  (yt)]
1 + 
, t 2 f0; 1g ; (14)
where we used that `t = v(yt) = minfdt; v(y)g from (10). The term on the numerator on the right side of
(14) is the buyers expected discounted utility over the 2-period cycle starting in t+ 1. We dene, for each
d0 2 [0; dmax],
(d0)  maxfd1 : (d0; d1) satises (14) with t = 1g; (15)
the highest debt limit in odd periods consistent with a debt limit equal to d0 in even periods. A 2-period-
cycle equilibrium, or simply a 2-period cycle, is a pair (d0; d1) that satises d0  (d1) and d1  (d0). The
function (d) is positive, non-decreasing, and concave.23 The function  is represented in the two panels of
Figure 3. It is non-decreasing because if the debt limit in even periods increases, then the punishment from
defaulting gets larger and, as a consequence, higher debt limits can be sustained in odd periods. So there
are complementarities between buyerstrustworthiness in odd periods and buyerstrustworthiness in even
periods. The function (d) is always positive because even if credit shuts down in even periods, it can be
sustained in odd periods by the threat of autarky in both odd and even periods. For a given d0 we dene
the set of debt limits in odd periods that are consistent with a 2-period cycle by

(d0)  fd1 : d0  (d1); d1  (d0)g : (16)
In Figure 3 the set of credit cycles is the area between  and its mirror image with respect to the 45o line.
Proposition 5 (2-Period Credit Cycles) For all d0 2 [0; dmax) the set of 2-period cycles with initial debt
limit, d0, denoted 
(d0), is a non-degenerate interval.
If agents are su¢ ciently impatient, as in the left panel of Figure 3, then the debt limit binds and output is
ine¢ ciently low in every period for all credit cycles. However, if agents are patient, then there are equilibria
where the debt limit binds periodically. Such equilibria are represented by the blue and green areas in the
right panel of Figure 3.
There are equilibria where credit dries up periodically. In the left panel of Figure 3 such equilibria
correspond to the case where d0 = 0 < d1 < (0) = dmin, i.e., even-period IOUs are believed to be worthless
23We prove properties of the function  in the Appendix. In particular, dmin  (0) > 0, (d) > d for all d 2 (0; dmax), and
(dmax) = dmax. If (y) < dmax, then (d) = dmax for all d 2 [(y); dmax].
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Figure 3: Set of two-period credit cycles.
while odd-period IOUs are repaid. If a seller extends a loan in an even period, the buyer defaults, in
accordance with equilibrium beliefs, but remains trustworthy in subsequent odd periods. Such outcomes
are ruled out by backward induction in pure-currency economies. In contrast a credit economy has IOUs
issued at di¤erent dates (and by di¤erent agents), and hence agents can form di¤erent beliefs regarding the
terminal value of these di¤erent securities.
The result according to which there are a continuum of equilibria does not imply that everything goes.
Fundamentals, such as preferences and the matching technology, do matter for the outcomes that can emerge.
If agents become more patient, i.e., r decreases, then  shifts upward, as the discounted sum of future
utility ows associated with a given allocation increases, and the set of 2-period cycle equilibria expands.
The expansion of the equilibrium set is represented by the dark yellow area in the left panel of Figure 3.
Similarly, if the frequency of matches, , increases, then dmax increases as permanent autarky entails a larger
opportunity cost, and the set of credit cycles expands.
One can generalize the above arguments to T -period cycles, fdjgT 1j=0 . In Figure 4 we represent the set of
3-period cycles for a given d2. The outer edge of this set, which has positive measure in R2, is represented
by a thick black curve. One can also see from the right panel that there is a non-empty set of 3-period cycles
(the pink area) where credit shuts down periodically, once (d2 = 0) or twice (e.g., d1 = d2 = 0) every three
periods. Also, for our parametrization the rst best is implementable, i.e., there are equilibria in the purple
area with dt  d = 1 for all t 2 f0; 1; 2g. All these examples show that it is not hard to generate cycles in
pure credit economies once one abandons restrictive not-too-tightsolvency constraints.
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Figure 4: Set of three-period credit cycles under u(y) = 2
p
y; v(y) = y;  = 0:9;  = 0:25. The right panel
shows two level planes with d2 = 0 and d2 = 1.
5.4 Secular credit growth
Not only can our model deliver generic uctuations in credit conditions, it also features endogenous credit
growth. There are PBE equilibria that feature monotone-increasing debt limits and increasing consumption
nanced with unsecured credit. In contrast, under not-too-tightsolvency constraints fdtg is always weakly
monotone decreasing.
Proposition 6 (Secular Credit Growth) For all T > 1 and dT 2 (0; dmax], there exists equilibria such
that fdtgTt=0 is monotone increasing.
As an example, suppose that for all t  T the debt limit is equal to its maximum, dmax. One can think
of the economy as maturing at period T in that it achieves the highest level of trust and the highest level
of consumption nanced with unsecured credit. In order to obtain a strictly increasing sequence, we impose
that dT 1  dmax. Similarly, at time T   2,
dT 2 < [u(yT 1)  v(yT 1)] + 2dmax:
We can iterate until we reach d0. Moreover, we can pick d0 = 0 so at the initial date there is no unsecured
credit as agents are not trusted to repay their debt. In subsequent periods debt limits increase over time as
buyers become more trustworthy.
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5.5 Sunspot equilibria with applications to the labor market
We now describe equilibria where individual debt limits are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Suppose that
agents are heterogeneous in terms of some state  2 X. We assume that  does not a¤ect DM preferences or
matching probabilities, but it could a¤ect the buyers endowment or income in the CM. This characteristic
could be the name of the individual, a physical characteristic, or his employment status in the context of
a model with unemployment. Let (0j) > 0 denote the Markov transition function of the state for all
0 2 X given some initial state . A sunspot credit equilibrium is then a vector, hd :  2 Xi, of debt limits
indexed by the states. Given the vector of debt limits, d = hd :  2 Xi, the value of a buyer along the
equilibrium path satises
V b (d) =  [u(y)  (y)] + 
Z
V b0(d)d(
0j); (17)
for all  2 X and y = minfy;  1(d)g. For any d = hd :  2 Xi, it is straightforward to show that there
is a unique vector hV b (d) :  2 Xi that satises (17) by the Blackwell su¢ cient condition and the contraction
mapping theorem. As before, the lifetime utility of a buyer is the expected discounted sum of the surpluses
coming from DM trades. It follows that a sunspot credit equilibrium is a vector, hd; 2 Xi, that satises
d  
Z
V b0(d)d(
0j) 8 2 X: (18)
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Sunspot equilibria) Suppose that X has at least two elements and let (0j) be a tran-
sition function over X with a full support. For a given (; d) 2 X  (0; dmax), the set of sunspot credit
equilibria with debt limit d in state , denoted by 
X;(; d), has a positive Lebesgue measure in RjXj 1.
This version of the model can easily be integrated in a model of unemployment, following Berensten,
Menzio, and Wright (2010) and its version with unsecured credit by Bethune, Rocheteau, and Rupert (2015).
Suppose that  2 f0; 1g is the buyers employment state. One can construct equilibria where d0 < d1 and
y0 < y1, unemployed workers have lower debt limits than employed ones even if they have enough resources
to repay their debt in the CM. The fact that the employment status matters for the access to credit has
implications for the determination of the wage and rmsdecision to open vacancies.
6 Extensions
In the following we show that our results regarding the equilibrium set of pure credit economies are robust
to trading mechanisms other than take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by buyers. We also extend our model in order
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to parametrize buyerstemptation to renege on their debt. This assumption plays a key role in GMMW to
generate cycles.
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Figure 5: Timing of the extended model with temptation to renege.
Suppose from now on that a buyer who promises to deliver ` units of goods in the next CM incurs the
linear disutility of producing at the time he is matched in the DM. This new timing is illustrated in Figure
5.24 The e¤ort exerted by the buyer in the DM, `, is perfectly observable to the seller. At the time of
delivery, at the beginning of the CM, the disutility of production has been sunk and the buyer has the option
to renege on his promise to deliver the good. The buyers utility from consuming his own output is ` with
  1. A buyer has no incentive to produce more output than the amount he promises to repay to the
seller since the net utility gain from producing x units of the good for oneself is (   1)x  0. Although
the physical environment is di¤erent, mathematically speaking, the model of the previous section can be
regarded as a special case with  = 1. As before we only focus on symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria that
satisfy (A1)-(A3).25
Let f(dt; yt; `t)g1t=0 be the sequence of equilibrium debt limits and trades. A necessary condition for the
repayment of dt to be incentive feasible is V bt+1  dt, where the left side is a buyers continuation value
from delivering the promised output and the right side of the inequality is the utility of a buyer if he keeps
the output for himself, in which case he enjoys a utility ow dt, and goes to autarky. Following the same
reasoning as before, a credit equilibrium is reduced to a sequence, fdtg1t=0, that satises
dt  V bt+1 = 
+1X
s=1
s [u(yt+s)  `t+s)] ; t 2 N0; (19)
24The description of the buyers incentive problem is taken from GMMW.
25GMMW also introduce an imperfect record-keeping technology as follows. At the end of the CM of period t the repayments
are recorded for a subset of buyers, Brt  B, chosen at random among all buyers. The set, Brt , of monitored buyers is of measure
, and the draws from B are independent across periods. So in every period, while his promise is always recorded, a buyer has a
probability  of having his repayment decision being recorded. Any equilibrium of our model with  < 1 is also an equilibrium
with  = 1. Hence, setting  = 1 is with no loss in generality.
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where the relationship between yt, `t, and dt will depend on the assumed trading mechanism.
6.1 Bargaining
It is standard in the literature on markets with pairwise meetings to determine the outcome of a meeting by
an axiomatic bargaining solution. In this section we consider the generalized Nash solution.26 We adopt the
representation of the equilibrium with solvency constraints, `t  dt, in order to obtain a convex bargaining
set.27 For a given sequence of debt limits, fdtg+1t=0 , the buyer repays minf`t; dtg if his date-t obligation from
his DM trade is `t. Due to the linearity of the CM value functions, the buyers surplus from a DM trade,
(yt; `t) with `t  dt, is u(yt)  `t and the sellers surplus is  (yt) + `t. Under generalized Nash bargaining
the terms of the loan contract are
(yt; `t) = argmax [u(y)  `] [`  (y)]1  s.t. `  dt:
The solution is given by
yt = z(dt)  minfy;  1(dt)g and `t = [z(dt)]: (20)
where
(y) = (y)v(y) + [1 (y)]u(y) and (y) = u0(y)= [u0(y) + (1  )v0(y)] : (21)
A sequence, fdtg+1t=0 , is a credit equilibrium under generalized Nash bargaining if and only if
dt  
+1X
i=1
i [u(yt+i)  (yt+i)] ; 8t 2 N0; (22)
where yt is the solution to (20).
We denote y^ = argmax fu(y)  (y)g the output level that maximizes the buyers surplus. Unlike the
proportional solution y^ < y for all  < 1. As a result the buyers surplus, u(y) (y), in the right side of the
participation constraint, (22), is non-monotonic with the debt limit provided that  < 1.28 It follows that
the function (d) is hump-shaped, reaching a maximum at d = d^  (y^) and it is constant for d > (y).
In Figure 6 we represent the function  and the set of pairs, (d0; d1), consistent with a 2-period credit cycle
equilibrium. One can see that the results are qualitatively unchanged except for the fact that the credit
limits at a periodic equilibrium can be greater than the highest debt limit at a stationary equilibrium. This
result will have important normative implications.
26We also characterized equilibria under the Kalai proportional solution. See our working paper for details.
27Even though the bargaining solution is axiomatic we could consider a simple game where upon being matched the buyer
and the seller receive a proposal that they can either accept or reject. The focus here, however, is not on strategic foundations
for axiomatic bargaining solutions.
28This non-monotonicity property of the Nash bargaining solution and its implications for monetary equilibria is discussed
at length in Aruoba et al. (2007).
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The two red stars in the left panel of Figure 6 are the strict two-period cycles under not-too-tight
solvency constraints that GMMW focuses on. Such cycles are located at the intersection of  and its
mirror image with respect to the line d1 = d0. It should be clear that the non-monotonicity of the trading
mechanism is necessary to obtain such cycles. It can also be checked that cycles under not-too-tight
solvency constraints do not exist when  = 1 (see GMMW).
1d
1d
0d0d
01 dd =01 dd =
maxd
maxd
maxd
maxd
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Figure 6: Set of two-period cycles under Nash bargaining or competitive pricing.
In the top panels of Figure 7 we plot the numerical examples in Gu and Wright (2011) under generalized
Nash bargaining for the following functional forms and parameter values: u(y) = [(x+ b)1 a  b1 a]=(1  a)
with a = 2 and b = 0:082, v(y) = Ay,  = 0:6,  = 1,  = 0:01, and  = 3=40. In the top-left panel, A = 1:1,
the two 2-period cycles under not-too-tightsolvency constraints are such that borrowing constraints bind
periodically. In the top-right panel, A = 1:5, the borrowing constraint binds in all periods. For both examples
there exists a continuum of PBE 2-period cycles, a fraction of which feature borrowing constraints that bind
periodically and a fraction of which have borrowing constraints that bind in all periods.
6.2 Competitive pricing
Here we follow Kehoe and Levine (1993) and AJ and assume that the terms of the loan contract in the
DM are determined by competitive pricing. We reinterpret matching shocks as preference and productivity
shocks, i.e., only  buyers want to consume and only  sellers can produce. As in the previous sections,
buyersrepayment strategy follows a threshold rule: for a given sequence of debt limits, fdtg+1t=0 , the buyer
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repays minf`t; dtg if his date-t obligation from his DM trade is `t.29 Moreover, the overall amount of debt
issued by a buyer in the DM of period t, `t, is known to all agents. Hence, if pt denotes the price of DM
output in terms of the numéraire, the buyers problem is maxy fu(y)  ptyg s.t. pty  dt. The solution is
yt = min

u0 1(pt); dt=pt
	
. Using that there is the same measure, , of buyers and sellers participating in the
market, market clearing implies pt = v0(yt). As a result yt = y if yv0(y)  dt and (yt)  ytv0(yt) = dt
otherwise. The buyers surplus is u(y)   py = u(y)   0(y)y. For a given p, the buyers surplus is non-
decreasing in his borrowing capacity, dt. However, once one takes into account the fact that p = v0(y) then
the buyers surplus is non-monotone in his capacity to borrow, dt. Provided that  is strictly convex, the
buyers surplus reaches a maximum for y = y^ < y.
A sequence, fdtg+1t=0 , is a credit equilibrium under competitive pricing if and only if (22) holds for all
t 2 N0, where yt is given by
yt = z(dt)  minfy;  1(dt)g and `t = [z(dt)]; (23)
A steady state is a d such that
rd   fu [z(d)]  0 [z(d)] z(d)g : (24)
Under some weak assumptions on v (for example, (y) = 0(y)y is convex), dmax > 0, i.e., there exists a
continuum of steady-state equilibria. This also implies that there exist a continuum of strict, 2-period, credit
cycle equilibria.30 This result can be contrasted with the ones in GMMW (Corollary 1-3) where conditions
on parameter values are needed to generate a nite number (typically, two) of cycles. The right panel of
Figure 6 illustrates these di¤erences. Under not-too-tightsolvency constraints credit cycles are determined
at the intersection between (d) and its mirror image with respect to the 45o line. These cycles are marked
by a red star. If we allow for slack buyersparticipation constraints, cycles are at the intersection of the
area underneath (d) and its mirror image with respect to the 45o line the blue area in the gure. Finally,
Proposition 4 on the equivalence result between monetary equilibria and credit equilibria holds for Walrasian
pricing as well. (See the Supplementary Appendix S1 for a formal proof).
We now review the numerical examples in GMMW in the case where the DM market is assumed to be
competitive. The functional forms are u(y) = y, v(y) = y1+=(1 + ), and there are no idiosyncratic shocks,
 = 1. The rst example in the bottom left panel of Figure 7 is obtained with the following parameter values:
 = 2:1,  = 0:4,  = 1=6. GMMW identify two (strict) two-period cycles under not-too-tight solvency
29 If a buyer repays xt 6= `t in the CM, then each unit of IOU issued by that buyer has a payo¤ equal to xt=`t units of
numéraire to its owner.
30Under competitive pricing, the function  (analogous to (15)) may not be monotone or concave, but the logic for Proposition
5 does not depend on those properties. See also the supplementary appendix S2 for a formal proof of the existence of 2-period
cycles.
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Generalized Nash bargaining
Price taking
Figure 7: The blue area is the set of all PBE credit cycles. The red dots are credit cycles under AJ not-
too-tight solvency constraints. The top panels are obtained under generalized Nash bargaining while the
bottom panels are obtained under price taking.
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constraints , (d0; d1) = (0:477; 0:936) and its converse, marked by red dots in the gure. The second example
in the bottom right panel is obtained with the following parameter values:  = 0:5,  = 0:9,  = 1=10. The
credit cycles under not-too-tightsolvency constraints, (d0; d1) = (0:933; 1:037) and its converse, are such
that period allocations uctuate between being debt-constrained and unconstrained. We nd a much bigger
set of PBE credit cycles represented by the blue colored region. There are a continuum of cycles such that
the allocations uctuate between being debt-constrained and unconstrained and a continuum of cycles such
that agents are debt-constrained in all periods. In the second example, the credit cycle under not-too-tight
solvency constraints is such that (y0; y1) = (0:96; 1:00) while the most volatile PBE is (y0; y1) = (0:96; 0:00).
6.3 Credit cycles and welfare
We now show that the imposition of not-too-tight solvency constraints not only reduces drastically the
equilibrium set, but it does so by eliminating equilibria with good normative properties. To see this, we
consider the set of two-period cycles represented in the left panel of Figure 7 ( = 2:1,  = 0:4,  = 1=6),
and we measure societys welfare by u [y(d0)] v [y(d0)]+ fu [y(d1)]  v [y(d1)]g. In the left panel of Figure
8 we highlight in red and green the set of 2-period cycles, (d0; d1), that dominate the equilibria under not-
too-tightsolvency constraints (marked by stars). There exist a continuum of such cycles that feature slack
participation constraints. Hence, the imposition of not-too-tight solvency constraints eliminates good
equilibria.31 The right panel of Figure 8 increases  from  = 1=6 to  = 1=4. There is no credit cycle under
the not-too-tightsolvency constraints, but there are a continuum of PBE cycles where credit constraints
are too-tight, and a fraction of those equilibrium outcomes dominate the highest steady state in social
welfare.
7 Conclusion
We have characterized the set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of a pure credit economy under
limited commitment. The economy features inter-temporal gains from trade that can be exploited with
one-period loan contracts. Such contracts and their execution are publicly recorded. Agents interact either
through random, pairwise meetings under various trading mechanisms, as in the New-Monetarist literature,
or in competitive spot markets, as in AJ. The set of equilibria can be characterized by a set of solvency
constraints (that can vary through time or across agents).
We showed that the equilibrium set is much larger than the one obtained under the not-too-tight
31 In Bethune et al. (2017) we study in details the planners problem for a similar economy and establish conditions under
which constrained-e¢ cient allocations feature "too-tight" solvency constraints.
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Figure 8: Non-stationary outcomes can dominate stationary outcomes. The blue area is set of all two-period
cycles. The red star is the two-period cycle in GMMW and the green star is the highest steady state. The
red and green lines represent level curves of social welfare from the two-period cycle in GMMW and the
highest steady state. Left panel:  = 1=6; Right panel:  = 1=4.
solvency constraints imposed throughout the literature and that the new equilibria are relevant both theo-
retically and empirically. For instance, we found a continuum of endogenous cycles and sunspot equilibria
with credit booms and busts. Some credit cycles are such that credit shuts down periodically and some credit
cycles generate larger welfare than stationary equilibria under not-too-tight solvency constraints. There
are also equilibria where endogenous debt limits increase over time, consistent with the secular growth of
the consumption share nanced with unsecured credit. Finally, equilibrium outcomes of the pure currency
economy are outcomes of the pure credit economy, but the reverse is not true. In summary, imposing not-
too-tight solvency constraints can, in general, entail a severe loss in generality for positive analysis with
consequences for normative analysis.
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Appendix: Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Proposition 1 ()) Here we prove necessity. Suppose that f(yt; xt; `t)g1t=0 is an equilibrium
outcome in a credit equilibrium, (sb; ss).
(i) Here we show condition (4). Because the worst payo¤ to buyers at each period is 0 (autarky) while the
equilibrium payo¤ at period t is u(yt)  xt, condition (4) is necessary for buyers to repay their promises at
each period.
(ii) To show condition (5), we rst show that xt = v(yt) for all t. Note that (A3) implies that xt = `t for
all t. If xt < v(yt), then the seller would not accept the o¤er. Suppose, by contradiction, that xt > v(yt).
Then, the buyer may deviate and o¤er (y0; `t) with v(y0) 2 (v(yt); `t). Because this deviation does not a¤ect
the buyers public record and the buyer has the same incentive to repay his debt, it is dominant for the seller
to accept it. It then is a protable deviation because y0 > yt.
Next, to show that yt  y for all t, suppose, by contradiction, that yt > y and hence u(yt)  xt 
v(yt) > v(y
). Then there exists an alternative o¤er, (y0; `0) = (y0; x0), such that u(y0)  x0 > u(yt)  xt and
 v(y0) + x0 >  v(yt) + xt and `0  `t. It is dominant for the seller to accept this alternative o¤er. The
sellers payo¤ at the current period is 0 if he rejects. However, if he accepts, then by (A3), the threshold
rule for repayment, the buyer will repay his promise `0 = x0. Then, by accepting the o¤er the seller obtains
 v(y0) + x0 > 0. Thus, (y0; `0) is a protable deviation for the buyer.
(() Here we show su¢ ciency. Let f(yt; xt; `t)g1t=0 be a sequence satisfying (4) and (5). Consider (sb; ss)
given as follows. Buyers can be in two states, i;t 2 fG;Ag, and each buyers initial state is i;0 = G. The
law of motion of the buyer is state are given by:
i;t+1

(`0; x0; i); i;t

=

A if x0 < min(xt; `0) or i;t = A
G otherwise
: (25)
The strategies are such that sbt;1(
i
t) = (yt; `t) if the state for 
i
t is G and s
b
t;1(
i
t) = (0; 0) otherwise;
sbt;2(
i
t; (y
0; `0); yes) = minf`0; `tg if the state for it isG and sbt;2(it; (y0; `0); yes) = 0 otherwise; sst (it; (y0; `0)) =
yes if the state for it is G and v(y
0)  minf`0; `tg, and sst (it; (y0; `0)) = no otherwise. We show that (sb; ss)
is a credit equilibrium.
Given sb, ss is optimal: the seller expects a buyer in state G to repay up to `t at period t and hence he
accepts an o¤er, (y0; `0), if v(y0)  minf`0; `tg; with buyers in state A he expects no repayment at all and
hence rejects any o¤er. Next, we show that sb is optimal given ss. Consider a buyer with state A at the
beginning of period t. Any o¤er to the seller is rejected and therefore it is optimal for the buyer to o¤er
(0; 0). Similarly, for such a buyer at the CM stage at period t with a promise `0, his state will remain in A,
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independent of his repayment decision and hence it is optimal to repay nothing.
Now consider a buyer with state G at the CM stage of period t, with a promise `0 made to the seller. The
buyer has to pay minf`t; `0g to maintain state G. By (4), paying this amount is better than becoming an
A person, whose continuation value is 0. Finally, consider a buyer with state G at the beginning of period
t. Note that under sb, his continuation value from period t+ 1 onward is independent of his o¤er at period
t. Moreover, for any o¤er (y; `), the seller accepts the o¤er if and only if v(y)  minf`; `tg. Thus, a buyers
problem is
max
(y;`)
u(y) minf`; `tg s.t. v(y)  minf`; `tg:
Because `t = v(yt)  v(y), (yt; `t) is a solution to the problem.
Proof of Corollary 1 (() Here we show su¢ ciency. Let fdtg1t=0 be a sequence satisfying (9) and
(10). Then, we can determine the outcome, f(yt; xt; `t)g1t=0, consistent with fdtg1t=0 by the solution to the
bargaining problem, (8), that is, xt = `t = v(yt) = minfv(y); dtg for each t. It remains to show that
f(yt; xt; `t)g1t=0 is the outcome of a credit equilibrium, (sb; ss), with buyersrepayment strategy consistent
with fdtg1t=0. As in the proof of Proposition 1, the strategy follows a simple nite automaton with two
states, i;t 2 fG;Ag, and each buyers initial state is i;0 = G. The law of motion of the buyer is state are
given by:
i;t+1

(`0; x0; i); i;t

=

A if x0 < min(dt; `0) or i;t = A
G otherwise
: (26)
This law of motion is the same as (25), where dt replaces xt. The strategies are analogous to those constructed
in the proof of Proposition 1, but with dt as the maximum amount of debt the buyer repays: at date t, the
buyer o¤ers (yt; `t) in state G, the seller accepts the o¤er (y0; `0) i¤ v(y0)  `0  dt and the buyers state is
G, and the buyer repays min(`0; dt) in the CM in state G if `0 is the loan issued in DM. Following exactly
the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 1, (9) and (10) ensure that (sb; ss) is a credit equilibrium.
()) Here we show necessity. Let fdtg1t=0 be a sequence consistent with a credit equilibrium outcome,
f(yt; xt; `t)g1t=0. By denition, fdtg1t=0 satises (10). To show (9), consider a buyer at period-t CM with a
loan size `0 = dt (perhaps on an o¤-equilibrium path). For repayment of dt to be optimal in state G, (9)
must hold, i.e., the buyer prefers repaying dt to permanent autarky.
Proof of Corollary 2 Rewrite the incentive-compatibility constraint (11) at time t + 1 and multiply it
by  to obtain:
dt+1  2 f [u(yt+2)  v(yt+2)] + dt+2g : (27)
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Combining (11) and (27) we get:
dt   f [u(yt+1)  v(yt+1)]g+ 2 f [u(yt+2)  v(yt+2)]g+ 2dt+2:
By successive iterations we generalize the inequality above as follows:
dt 
TX
s=1
s f [u(yt+s)  v(yt+s)]g+ t+T dt+T : (28)
By assumption, fdtg is bounded, limT!1 t+T dt+T = 0. Hence, by taking T to innity, it follows from (28)
that fdtg satises (9).
Proof of Proposition 2 We characterize symmetric equilibria according to d0. We consider three cases.
(a) Suppose that d0 = 0. Then, (9) at equality implies that u(yt) v(yt) = 0 for all t > 0, which, in turn,
by (10), implies that dt = 0 for all t > 0.
(b) Suppose that d0 = dmax. Note that not-too-tightsolvency constraint also implies that (11) holds
with equality. We show by induction that dt = dmax for all t. Suppose that dt = dmax. Then, (11) at
equality, dmax =  f [u(yt+1)  v(yt+1)] + dt+1g, and hence, by by (10),
1

dmax   dt+1 =  [u(z(dt+1))  v(z(dt+1))] : (29)
By denition, dt+1 = dmax is a solution to (29), and, since the right side of (29) is increasing in dt+1 and the
left-side is strictly decreasing, it is also the unique solution. This proves dt = dmax for all t.
(c) Suppose that d0 2 (0; dmax). We show by induction that there is a unique sequence fdt+1gt0 that
satises (11) at equality with yt+1 pinned down by (10) and that dt+1 < dt for all t  0. To see this, for any
given dt 2 (0; dmax), consider the following equation
1

dt   dt+1 =  [u(z(dt+1))  v(z(dt+1))] : (30)
Since dt < dmax, for dt+1 = dt,
1

dt   dt = rdt <  [u(z(dt))  v(z(dt))] ;
while for dt+1 = 0,
1

dt >  [u(z(0))  v(z(0))] :
Hence, there is a unique solution dt+1 2 (0; dt) to the equation (30). Moreover, by Corollary 2, such a
sequence corresponds to a credit equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 3 Dene the right side of (12) as a function
	(d) =  fu [z(d)]   [z(d)]g : (31)
	 is continuous in d with 	(0) = 0 and 	(d) =  [u (y)  v (y)] for all d  v(y). Moreover, it is
di¤erentiable with
	0(d) = 

u0[z(d)]  v0[z(d)]
v0[z(d)]

if d 2 (0; v(y)], and 	0(d) = 0 if d > v(y):
This derivative is decreasing in d for all d 2 (0; v(y)). Hence, 	 is a concave function of d, and the set of
values for d that satises (12) is an interval [0; dmax], where dmax  0 is the largest number that satises
	(dmax) = rdmax. Moreover, dmax > 0 if and only if 	0(0) > r, which is always satised since 	0(0) =1 by
assumption on preferences.
Since in our framework each buyers future gains from trade and hence his debt limit is unrelated to
other buyers, the existence of asymmetric equilibria in which a buyer is debt limit is such that di 2 [0; dmax]
follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 4 Replace dt = t into the buyers optimality condition in a monetary economy,
(13), to get
dt = dt+1

1 + 
u0(yt+1)  0(yt+1)
0(yt+1)

: (32)
The right side of (32), [u0(yt+1)  0(yt+1)] =0(yt+1), is the derivative of the function, u[v 1(dt+1)]   dt+1,
with respect to dt+1. From the strict concavity of the function and the fact that it is equal to 0 when
evaluated at dt+1 = 0,
u0(yt+1)  0(yt+1)
0(yt+1)
dt+1 < u(yt+1)  (yt+1): (33)
From (32) and (33),
dt <  [u(yt+1)  (yt+1)] + dt+1: (34)
Iterating (34),
dt <
JX
j=1
j [u(yt+j)  (yt+j)] + Jdt+J : (35)
Applying the transversality condition, limJ!1 Jdt+J = 0 to (35), we prove that the sequence, fdtg, is a
solution to (32) satises (9), and hence it is part of a credit equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5 Before the proof proper, we need a lemma about the function (d).
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Lemma 1 The function (d) is positive, non-decreasing, and concave. Moreover, dmin  (0) > 0, (d) > d
for all d 2 (0; dmax), and (dmax) = dmax. If (y) < dmax, then (d) = dmax for all d 2 [(y); dmax].
Proof. Dene the correspondence   : R+  R+ as follows:
 (d) = fx 2 R+ : r (1 + )x   fu [z(d)]   [z(d)]g+  fu [z(x)]   [z(x)]g : (36)
Then, (d) = max (d). First we show that  (d) is a closed interval and  is well-dened. By denition,
x 2  (d) if and only if
r(1 + )x  	(d) + 	(x);
where 	(d) =  fu [z(d)]   [z(d)]g. Using a similar argument to that in Proposition 3,  (d) is a closed
interval with zero as the lower end point. Thus,  is well-dened, and (d) is the largest x that satises
r (1 + )x = 	(d) + 	(x): (37)
Moreover, if d > d0, then  (d0)   (d), and hence  is a non-decreasing function: Because 	(d) is constant
for all d  v(y),  is constant for all d  v(y), but it is strictly increasing for d < v(y). Now we show that
(0) > 0; (dmax) = dmax;
where dmax is given in Proposition 3. First, as 	(0) = 0, and 	(x) is a concave function, (0) > 0 if and
only if r(1 + ) < 	0(0) = 1, which holds by Inada conditions. Moreover, as the two curves r (1 + )x
and 	(x) intersect at (0)  dmin > 0, by concavity of 	 we have 	0(dmin) < r(1 + ). Second, by
Proposition 3, dmax > 0 and rdmax = 	(dmax). Therefore, r (1 + ) dmax = 	(dmax) + 	(dmax) and hence
(dmax) = dmax.
Finally, we show that  is a concave function. Applying the implicit function theorem to (37), for all
0 < d < v(y),
0(d) =
	0(d)
(1 + ) r   	0[(d)] :
Note that (1 + ) r   	0[(0)] = (1 + ) r   	0(dmin) > 0 and hence (1 + ) r   	0[(d)] > 0 for all d.
By concavity of 	, 0(d) is decreasing in d. Hence,  is a concave function. 
Proof of Proposition 5 Proper:
Notice that, by denition, any pair (d0; d1) that satises d0  (d1) and d1  (d0) also satises (14)
with y0 = z(d0) and y1 = z(d1), and hence (d0; d1) is a 2-period credit cycle. By Lemma 1,  is a concave
function with (0) > 0 and (dmax) = dmax, and hence, (d) > d for all d 2 [0; dmax), where dmax is given
in Proposition 3. Thus, for each d0 2 [0; dmax), the interval [d0; (d0)] is nondegenerate and (d0) < dmax.
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Hence, for each d1 2 [d0; (d0)], d0  d1 < (d1), where we used that (d) > d for all d  (d0) < dmax,
so (d0; d1) is a 2-period credit cycle. This gives a full characterization of the set of 2-period cycles with
d0  d1, and the set of cycles with d1  d0 is its mirror image with respect to the 45 line. Thus, for each
d0 2 [0; dmax), the set 
(d0) is a nondegenerate interval.
Proof of Proposition 6 The proof is by construction. Let dT 2 (0; dmax] be given. We construct
fdT 1; dT 2; :::; d0g inductively as follows. Since dT > 0, there is a dT 1 > 0 such that
dT 1 < min fdT ;  f [u(yT )  (yT )] + dT gg ;
where yT = minf 1(dT ); yg. Suppose that we have chosen dT s > 0. Then, there exists dT (s+1) > 0
such that
dT (s+1) < min fdT s;  f [u(yT s)  (yT s)] + dT sgg ;
where yT s = minf 1(dT s); yg. This completes the induction.
Proof of Proposition 7 Here we show that for any transition function over X with a full support, denoted
by , we have a continuum of sunspot equilibria indexed by d 2 (0; dmax). For any d 2 (0; dmax), we have
rd < fu[z(d)]  [z(d)]g: (38)
Fix an element 0 2 X and let X 0 = X  f0g: Dene the set

(X;)(d0) =

dX 0=hd :  2 X 0i : d  
Z
V b0(hd0 ;dX 0i)d(0j) for all  2 X

:
Let d0 2 (0; dmax). Then, by (38), the sequence hd :  2 X 0i with d = d0 for all  2 X 0 is in

(X;)(d0) where all inequalities in the denition above are strict inequalities. Thus, the set 
(X;)(d0)
contains an open ball with a positive radius centered at hd :  2 X 0i with d = d0 for all  2 X 0.
Hence, it has a positive Lebesgue measure in RjX 0j and almost all points in it satisfy d 6= d0 for all  6= 0.
Note that for any hd :  2 X 0i 2 (d), hd; 2 Xi with d0 = d is a sunspot credit equilibrium by (18).
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Supplementary Appendices
S1. Equivalence between monetary and credit equilibria
Here we extend the equivalence result, Proposition 4, to other trading mechanisms. We rst consider
bargaining in the pairwise meetings and then consider Walrasian pricing for large group meetings. We adopt
the environment introduced in Section 4 without record-keeping. The monetary trades follow a similar
pattern to that in Section 3.3: buyers who cannot commit to deliver goods in the CM use money to buy DM
goods from sellers in the DM. They produce CM goods in the rst stage of each period in order to sell them
for money in the CM. Notice that the timing of producing CM goods (whether it takes place in the rst
or second stage of each period) is irrelevant for buyersbehavior because it is only incentive-feasible to sell
these goods in the CM for money. Sellers use money obtained from DM sales to buy CM goods. Because
  1, buyers never produce CM goods for self-consumption. As a result, the parameter  plays no role in
monetary equilbria. So with no loss of generality we set  = 1.
Bargaining Under a general bargaining solution represented by the function (y), the sequence for the
values of money, ftg, solves
max
m0
ftm+  [u(yt+1)  (yt+1)]g
where t+1m = (yt+1) for all t. Replace dt = t for all t in the above problem and take the FOC, we obtain
dt = dt+1



u0(yt+1)
0(yt+1)
  1

+ 1

; (39)
where (yt) = dt for all t. In the credit economy, the debt limits, fdtg, solves
dt   f [u(yt+1)  (yt+1)] + dt+1g : (40)
Because  is concave, u   1(dt)   dt is concave in terms of the value of money. The right side of (39),
[u0(yt+1)  0(yt+1)] =0(yt+1), is the derivative of the function, u[ 1(dt+1)]   dt+1, with respect to dt+1.
From the strict concavity of the function and the fact that it is equal to 0 when evaluated at dt+1 = 0,
u0(yt+1)  0(yt+1)
0(yt+1)
dt+1 < u(yt+1)  (yt+1): (41)
From (39) and (41),
dt <  [u(yt+1)  (yt+1)] + dt+1: (42)
Iterating (42),
dt <
JX
j=1
j [u(yt+j)  (yt+j)] + Jdt+J : (43)
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Applying the transversality condition, limJ!1 Jdt+J = 0 to (43), we prove that the sequence, fdtg, solution
to (39) satises (40), and hence it is part of a credit equilibrium.
This concavity of  is satised for the proportional bargaining solution and for the general Nash bargaining
solution under the functional forms for u and  that guarantee the concavity of the buyers surplus.
Walrasian pricing Suppose the DM is competitive and pt denotes the price of DM goods in terms of
CM goods. In a monetary economy the buyer chooses money holdings as the solution to:
max
m;yt+10
 tm+  [u(yt+1)  pt+1yt+1] + t+1m	 ; (44)
where, t+1m  pt+1yt+1. The rst-order condition for (44) is
t = t+1



u0(yt+1)
pt+1
  1

+ 1

:
From the sellers maximization problem, pt+1 = 0(yt+1) so that ftg solves
t = t+1



u0(yt+1)
0(yt+1)
  1

+ 1

: (45)
It should be noticed that it is the same rst-order di¤erence equation as the one obtained under buyers
take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. Notice, using t+1 = 
0(yt+1)yt+1 by market-clearing (i.e., m = 1), that
t+1

u0(yt+1)
0(yt+1)
  1

= u0(yt+1)yt+1   0(yt+1)yt+1 < u(yt+1)  v0(yt+1)yt+1;
from the concavity of u. Recall that a su¢ cient condition for the sequence of debt limits to be a credit
equilibrium is
dt   f [u(yt+1)  v0(yt+1)yt+1] + dt+1g :
This proves that the phase of the monetary equilibrium is located to the left of the phase line of the credit
equilibrium. Hence, by the same reasoning as before, any outcome of the monetary economy is an outcome
of the credit economy.
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S2. Existence of 2-period cycles under alternative mechanisms
Walrasian pricing Under Walrasian pricing, (y) = v0(y)y. Here we show existence of a continuum
of 2-period cycles when (y) is convex. Recall that z(d) = minf 1(d); yg. Let dmax be the unique positive
solution to
rd =  fu [z(d)]   [z(d)]g : (46)
Lemma 2 Suppose that (y) is convex. For each d0 2 [0; dmax), there is a nondegenerate interval, 
(d0),
such that for any d1 2 
(d0), (d0; d1) is a (strict) 2-period cycle.
Proof. Because (y) is convex, there is a unique positive number, denoted ymax, such that
r(ymax) = [u(ymax)  (ymax)]:
It can be veried that that dmax is given by
dmax =

(ymax) if y  ymax
fu(y) (y)g
r otherwise.
Note that any d 2 [0; dmax] corresponds to a steady-state equilibrium. Let us turn to 2-period cycles. A
pair, (d0; d1), is a 2-period cycle if for t = 0; 1,
rdt   fu [z(dt+1)]   [z(dt+1)]g+  fu [z(dt)]   [z(dt)]g
1 + 
: (47)
Hence,

(d0) = fd1  0 : (d0; d1) satises (47)g:
For all d 2 [0; dmax), because rd <  fu [z(d)]   [z(d)]g, (d0; d1) = (d; d) satises (47) with a strict
inequality. Hence, by continuity, there is a nonempty open set contained in 
(d). Moreover, because  is
concave, the set 
(d) is convex and hence is a nondegenerate interval.
Nash bargaining For all y  y, u (y)  (y)  [u(y)  (y)] and hence (y)  (1  )u (y) + (y).
Under proportional bargaining a 2-period cycle solves
r [(1  )u (yt) + (yt)]  f [u (yt+1)  (yt+1)] +  [u (yt)  (yt)]g
1 + 
:
It implies
r (yt)  f [u (yt+1)  (yt+1)] +  [u (yt)  (yt)]g
1 + 
:
Hence (yt; yt+1), and the associated (dt; dt+1) = ((yt); (yt+1)), is a credit cycle under generalized Nash
bargaining.
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